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Abstract
The instability of Cournot cartels can be overcome by a collective wage
agreement if this agreement stipulates minimum ﬁxed wages and piece
rates that are legally enforceable. This new view on the institution of
collective wage agreements is not only relevant for strategic management,
it also has an important implication for economic policy: competition
authorities should observe such agreements for their potentially collusive
eﬀect on product markets. Moreover, the model contributes to the ex-
planation of the “ﬁxed wage puzzle”, i.e., the observation that ﬁrms pay
lower than eﬃcient variable wages and higher ﬁxed wages than predicted
by contract theory.
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11 Introduction
This paper analyzes how cartels can be stabilized by collective wage agreements
that implement ineﬃcient intra–ﬁrm incentives. Cartel agreements in Cournot
oligopolies suﬀer from instability: No cartel solution is a Nash equilibrium,
because each competitor has an incentive to choose an output greater than his
cartel quota.1 This instability could be overcome by a binding contract, but in
general, cartel agreements are not legally enforceable.
The cartel instability rests on the assumption that production takes place
in the absence of intra–ﬁrm conﬂicts. In our paper, we allow for the existence of
intra–ﬁrm conﬂicts resulting from delegation and moral hazard in oligopolistic
ﬁrms. These conﬂicts are modeled as a simple principal–agent problem. The
principal is unable to determine the ﬁrm’s output directly, but can choose a
variable payment (“piece rates”) and ﬁxed wages to inﬂuence the agent’s eﬀort
and, thereby, the ﬁrm’s output. In a world with risk neutral agents and risk
neutral principals, eﬃcient intra–ﬁrm incentives can be achieved when the agent
is assigned the position of the residual claimant. A contract that stipulates a
piece rate below the eﬃcient one induces the risk neutral agent to choose lower
than eﬃcient eﬀort. Under such a contract, the ﬁrm’s output is, ceteris paribus,
smaller than under a ﬁrst–best contract.
In our model, the principals can establish a cartel by a collective wage
agreement which provides ineﬃcient intra–ﬁrm incentives. This reduces each
ﬁrms’ output and increases the product market rent. To oﬀset the lower piece
rate, the ﬁxed wage paid by the cartel members to their agents has to be higher
than in the Cournot solution. Each ﬁrm has an individual incentive to deviate
by oﬀering eﬃcient intra–ﬁrm incentives to its own agent and, thereby, increase
its output. We prove that such a deviation is only beneﬁcial for the respective
ﬁrm if it can simultaneously decrease the ﬁxed wage. The latter, however, is
prohibited by the collective wage agreement. Thus, a legally enforceable ﬁxed
wage can eﬀectively stabilize the cartel agreement.
This eﬀect of linear contracts may contribute to the solution of the “ﬁxed
wage puzzle”, i.e., the fact that ﬁxed wages are ubiquitous in the real world
although economic theory strongly advocates variable pay. Moreover, collective
wage agreements that include proﬁt–sharing elements are quite common. E.g.,
1The shadow of the future may induce cartel agreements as Nash equilibria. In this paper,
we focus on one–shot games.
2the “Big Three” automobile producers in the US have introduced proﬁt sharing
components into the workers’ compensation after 1979.2 The US automobile
industry traditionally leads the way for collective wage bargaining in the US.
Our study is limited to input providers with linear contracts, consisting of
a piece rate and a ﬁxed wage. We assume that the minimum levels stipulated
by the collective agreement can be legally enforced, but we neglect the exact
enforcement process.3 Labor is the only input and wages are the only costs the
ﬁrms have to bear. A piece rate is a share of the value of the respective ﬁrm’s
output. A ﬁxed wage can be a monetary payment, but may also take the form of
health care or pension beneﬁts. Many papers on managerial incentives may not
exactly capture the real–world meaning of the term “manager”. The typical
principal–agent model sees the manager as the provider of “eﬀort”, a crucial
(and often the only) input which is required to produce the ﬁrm’s output. We
follow this terminology of the economic literature here.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related
literature. We set up and solve the model in Section 3. Finally, we draw
conclusions in Section 4.
2 Related literature
Surprisingly, the number of papers that simultaneously model oligopolistic com-
petition between ﬁrms and the existence of intra–ﬁrm conﬂicts between owners
and managers is rather small. The most prominent idea in this area is that
product market competition may serve as a device to discipline managers.4 Hart
(1983) has rigorously derived conditions under which increased product market
competition can provide information for principals, while Hermalin (1992) has
shown that competition can provide incentives for managers to work harder even
if the market results do not provide such information. Demougin/Tschernig
(1993) and Schmidt (1997) also discuss theoretically to which extent intra–
ﬁrm ineﬃciency caused by asymmetric information can be reduced through the
presence of market competition. The empirical evidence on the relationship be-
tween managerial incentives, competition and ﬁrm’s performance is, however,
mixed. Gaver/Gaver/Battistel (1992) have not found signiﬁcant stock market
2See Katz/MacDuﬃe/Pil (2002, 22).
3Alexander/Reifen (1995) show that collusive minimum–price two–part tariﬀ agreements
require an outside enforcer, while price ceilings are self–enforcing.
4See Berle/Means (1932) and Leibenstein (1966).
3reactions to the introduction of performance payment schemes for top managers,
while Nickell (1996) has identiﬁed only weak empirical support for the idea that
product market competition improves corporate performance. The strategic
tool presented in our paper eﬀectively reduces product market competition and
thereby increases the ﬁrms’ proﬁt.
The mutual impact of competition and intra–team incentives is the subject
of the experimental paper by Bornstein/Gneezy (2002). However, the intra–ﬁrm
conﬂict in their paper is represented by two types of coordination games to be
played between the team members. The intra–ﬁrm incentives are exogenously
given and constitute the type of the ﬁrm. In our model, both the product market
behavior and the choice of intra–ﬁrm contracts are endogenous. Some other pa-
pers deal with isolated aspects of the interplay between intra–ﬁrm incentives and
competition: Glazer/Israel (1990) have shown that management compensation
schemes can serve as a signaling mechanism on the product market. Toulemonde
(1999) has observed that the wage structure may deter potential competitors
from market entry. Aggarwal/Samwick (1999) explain the lack of compensation
schemes that are based upon relative performance by the strategic interaction
between the ﬁrms.
Two papers which are closely related to our model are Sklivas (1987) and
Fershtmann/Judd (1987). The authors ask whether ﬁrms in an oligopoly ac-
tually choose intra–ﬁrm incentives so as to maximize proﬁts. They show that
intra–ﬁrm conﬂicts implement market outcomes which are more competitive
than those in the Cournot model without intra–ﬁrm conﬂicts. This result is
driven by the assumption that contracts cannot be made contingent on quan-
tity outcomes. The agents’ payments rather depend on a linear combination of
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt and revenues, and it is optimal for principals to oﬀers rewards
which put a positive weight on revenues. These models and their results diﬀer
substantially from ours, as we limit our focus to linear contracts. Moreover, both
Sklivas (1987) and Fershtmann/Judd (1987) do not make explicit the incentive
mechanism, and they neglect its impact on the ﬁrms’ costs. In our paper, we
explicitly model the incentive problem and include the agents’ wages into the
ﬁrms’ cost functions. Finally, they both overlook the collusive potential of a
collective wage agreement, which is the subject of our model. Hence, we expect
oligopolistic ﬁrms to behave less competitive than in a Cournot setting if a labor
union makes available collective wage agreements.
Another paper which appears to be close to ours at the ﬁrst glance is
4Bensa¨ ıd/ Gary–Bobo (1991). In their model, however, eﬀort costs within the
ﬁrm are assumed to be zero. Therefore, proﬁt–sharing contracts or ﬁxed wages
only serve to satisfy the participation constraint. Haucap/Pauly/Wey (2001) is
also close to our subject, but their model highlights a diﬀerent anti–competitive
aspect of collective wage setting. They start with two types of ﬁrms in one in-
dustry, one type produces with a labor–intensive technology, the other operates
capital–intensive. The latter type ﬁnds it beneﬁcial to agree upon high wages
in a collective wage agreement, which raises its rivals’ costs and increases its
own market share. In our model, the ﬁrms are homogeneous, and it is the wage
structure (piece rate vs. ﬁxed wage) that plays the crucial role.
3 The model
3.1 Setup
Consider a market with two symmetric ﬁrms i ∈ {1;2}, referred to as principals
Pi. Each principal can employ one out of two symmetric agents, Ai. No other
ﬁrms or agents may enter the game. The interaction takes place in four stages
t = 0..3:
1. In t = 0, both principals form an employers’ association and negotiate
over a collective wage agreement with the labor union, which consists of
both agents. A collective wage agreement consists of a ﬁxed wage, F, and
a piece rate, w. Hence, we limit our view to linear contracts.
2. In t = 1, each principal makes a take–it–or–leave–it oﬀer to his agent. If
a collective wage agreement, (F, w), has been closed, a principal is not
allowed to deviate downwards from this settlement.
3. In t = 2, the agent accepts or rejects the oﬀer. If he accepts, then he
produces output in t = 3, and payoﬀs are generated.
The agent spends eﬀort, denoted ei, to produce an amount of output Yi.
This causes eﬀort costs ci(ei) = e2
i. The production function is Yi(ei) = ei · ηi
for i ∈ {1;2}. The outputs are inﬂuenced by random variables, the realizations
of which are denoted as ηi ∈ I R
+. These random variables are independently
distributed with expected value E[ηi] = 1 and positive variance. Therefore, the
agents’ eﬀort choices are unobservable and non–veriﬁable. All four players are
5assumed to be risk–neutral. We neglect limited liability problems. The expected
output of ﬁrm i is E[Yi] = ei. The total expected output oﬀered in the market
accrues to E[Y ] = e1+e2. Consumers’ inverse demand is p = a−Y with a > 0,
where p represents the market price. If a contract oﬀer is rejected, the principal
receives nothing, while his agent obtains his outside option payoﬀ of u ≥ 0.5
The game is visualized in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The time line of the game
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We solve the game by backward induction. Each agent’s eﬀort choice in
t = 3, and his acceptance or refusal in t = 2, are discussed in Section 3.2. In
Section 3.3, we analyze the situation in t = 1 if no collective wage agreement has
been previously closed. This subgame reﬂects the standard Cournot duopoly
situation; its subgame value creates the outside option for the collective bar-
gaining in t = 0. In Section 3.4, we ﬁrst derive the optimal collective wage
agreement under two assumptions which will be relaxed later: The employers’
association has full bargaining power, and the parties obey the collective wage
agreement. In Section 3.4.2, we discuss the principals’ incentives to deviate. In
5For technical reasons we assume u < a2/5, which makes sure that duopolists may ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to engage in this market.
6Section 3.4.3, we introduce bargaining power on the part of the union in t = 0.
3.2 Eﬀort choices and acceptance decisions
In the last stage, each agent faces the maximization problem
e∗
i = argmax Fi + wiE[Yi(ei)] − ci(ei).
The ﬁrst–order condition for an internal maximum is wi = 2ei. Hence, the






Agent i expects the payoﬀ Fi + wiE[Yi(e∗
i(wi))] − ci(e∗
i(wi)) when deciding
whether or not to accept the oﬀer. Substituting the production function and
the eﬀort cost function, this equals Fi + w2
i/4. Agent Ai accepts if this payoﬀ
meets his outside option u. Therefore,
F∗
i (wi) = u − w2
i/4 (2)
is the minimum ﬁxed wage that obeys the participation constraint of agent Ai.
3.3 No collective wage agreement
Should the parties fail to reach a collective wage agreement, then both principals
do not have to obey legal constraints when choosing their contract oﬀer in t = 1.
Using equations (1) and (2), their individual choice problems can be stated in


















with i,j ∈ {1,2}, and i 6= j. The label D indicates that this reﬂects a
standard duopoly of the Cournot type.6
Each ﬁrm i chooses the piece rate to maximize proﬁts. The ﬁrst–order
condition for an internal solution is a/2 − wi − wj/4 = 0. Hence, the optimal






6The labor union can also be described as an upstream monopolist who is unable to commit
to a restriction of factor supply, which leads to the Cournot outcome in the downstream
market, see Rey/Tirole (2006, 12-14).
7In a similar way, we can derive the reaction function of ﬁrm j. Substituting
wD
j (wi) into equation (3) yields the Cournot duopoly solution (in piece rates)
wD
i = wD
j = 2a/5. The corresponding minimum ﬁxed wages are FD
i = u −
a2/25. By oﬀering (FD
i ,wD
i ), both ﬁrms induce their agents to produce eD
i =
a/5. The market output amounts to Y D = 2a/5, and the market price is
pD = 3a/5. Each ﬁrm’s proﬁt then accrues to ΠD
i = 2a2/25 − u. The agents
receive their outside option utility level of u.
In equilibrium, the revenue of ﬁrm i is RD




equation (1), the marginal revenue is MRD
i = a − wi − wj/2. Substitution of
the equilibrium piece rates yields MRD
i = 2a/5. Thus, in equilibrium, both
ﬁrms choose piece rates equal to their marginal revenues. From an individual
ﬁrm’s perspective, these piece rates create eﬃcient incentives.
3.4 Collective wage agreement
To derive the optimal cartel solution, we ﬁrst proceed with the assumption that
the employers’ association has full bargaining power. This will be relaxed in
Section 3.4.3. Moreover, we assume that an agreement is obeyed by the two
ﬁrms. In Section 3.4.2, we discuss the principals’ incentives to deviate from this
solution.
3.4.1 The optimal collective wage agreement
Under a collective wage agreement, the two ﬁrms form a cartel and act like
one monopolist who produces in two production sites with increasing marginal
costs. The cartel’s expected proﬁts amount to
EΠC = [p(ei(wi) + ej(wj)) − wi]ei − Fi + [p(ei(wi) + ej(wj)) − wj]ej − Fj.
The anticipated reactions of the two agents employed by the cartel are given by
equation (1). Using this, we can simplify the cartel’s proﬁt to
EΠC =





The ﬁrst–order conditions for an internal solution are (a−2wi −wj)/2 = 0 and
(a − 2wj − wi)/2 = 0. A cartel planner has to choose (wi,wj) such that these
conditions are simultaneously fulﬁlled. The proﬁt maximizing piece rates for
8both production sites of the cartel hence are wC
i = wC
j = a/3, and the corre-
sponding minimum ﬁxed wage which induces the agents to accept the contract
oﬀer is FC
i = FC





A contract oﬀer (FC
i ,wC
i ) induces eﬀorts eC
i = eC
j = a/6. Thus, the cartel
produces a total expected output of Y C = a/3. The market price is pC = 2a/3,
and the cartel members’ individual expected proﬁts amount to ΠC
i = a2/12−u.
In the unique cartel solution, each ﬁrm collects a higher proﬁt than as a Cournot
duopolist, since ΠC
i > ΠD
i . In the cartel optimum, each ﬁrms’ marginal revenues
amount to MRC
i = a − wC
i − wC
j /2 = a/2. The cartel solution is characterized
by MRC
i > wC
i . The marginal revenue of each ﬁrm exceeds the piece rate
oﬀered to its agent. While it would appear eﬃcient from an individual point
of view to oﬀer a piece rate equal to the marginal revenue, the cartel proﬁt
is maximized if the members agree upon piece rates which create ineﬃcient
intra–ﬁrm incentives.
Table 1: Overview of the main results
Duopoly Cartel
(no collective (optimal collective
wage agreement) wage agreement) comparison
wi 2a/5 a/3 wD
i > wC
i
minimum Fi u − a2/25 u − a2/36 FD
i < FC
i
ei a/5 a/6 eD
i > eC
i
Y 2a/5 a/3 Y D > Y C
p 3a/5 2a/3 pD < pC
Πi 2a2/25 − u a2/12 − u ΠD
i < ΠC
i
Π 4a2/25 − 2u a2/6 − 2u ΠC − ΠD = a2/150 > 0





Table 1 compares the results of the decentralized Cournot duopoly with no
collective wage agreement, to the centralized cartel planning with collective wage
agreement. Just as in the Cournot cartel with output quotas, both ﬁrms would
proﬁt from forming a cartel, but the cartel is not self–enforcing. Both members
may have an incentive to increase their output. The duopolists’ incentives to
deviate from the optimum cartel wages are analyzed in the following section.
93.4.2 Intra-ﬁrm incentives to deviate
In this section, we analyze a ﬁrm’s incentives to unilaterally deviate from an op-
timal cartel agreement. Both cartel members are required to pay a higher ﬁxed
wage to their agents than in the Cournot oligopoly. Even though, cartelization
would increase the industry proﬁt by ΠC −ΠD = 7a2/225. However, the cartel
piece rate wC
i is smaller than each cartel member’s marginal revenue. Both
cartel members thus have an incentive to deviate upwards from the piece rate
that maximizes the cartel proﬁt, regardless of whether the other ﬁrm complies
with the cartel agreement or not.





















Figure 2 illustrates the intra–ﬁrm incentives within ﬁrm i. It displays
the agent’s participation constraint, which consists of Fi–wi–combinations that
leave the agent with an (expected) payoﬀ equal to u. The curve slopes downward
from the intercept u at the Fi–axis. The agent prefers Fi–wi–combinations
above the participation constraint, as indicated by the tiny arrow. Furthermore,
Figure 2 shows the cartel solution (point C) and the duopoly solution (point
D). The area to the north–east of C depicts the Fi–wi–combinations a ﬁrm
is allowed to oﬀer under a collective (minimum) wage agreement; this area is
labeled “permitted deviations from C.”
Figure 2 also depicts a ﬁrm’s iso–proﬁt curve that represents its individual
proﬁt level in the cartel solution, ΠC
i (under the assumption that the other ﬁrm
10sticks to the agreed upon cartel piece rate wC
j ). In general, the ﬁrm’s iso–proﬁt









in the Fi–wi–diagram. The cartel situation is characterized by wC
j = a/3 and
Πi = ΠC










If Pj sets the cartel wage wC
j = a/3, then all iso–proﬁt curves of Pi have their
maximum at wi = 5a/18. Note that wi < wC
i . The ﬁrst derivative of this










For wi > 5a/18, the iso–proﬁt curve representing ΠC
i has a negative slope. This
is surprising at ﬁrst glance: The marginal proﬁt in the cartel solution is positive;
hence, the principal should be able to increase his proﬁt by oﬀering to the agent
a higher piece rate. If this would describe the situation correctly, the iso–proﬁt
curve had a positive slope. However, recall that the collective wage agreement
is limited to linear contracts in our model. Therefore, a higher piece does not
only increase the marginal cost of additional output, but also of the infra–
marginal units. Increasing the piece rate hence lowers the proﬁt. Therefore,
the iso–proﬁt curve has negative slope. The comparion of equations (2) and
(4) reveals that, in C, the iso–proﬁt is ﬂatter than the agent’s participation
constraint. The principal prefers lower wage combinations to higher ones, which
is indicated by the tiny arrow in Figure 2. Thus, her iso–proﬁt curve and the
agent’s participation constraint open up an area of wage combinations which
are bilaterally beneﬁcial, compared to the optimal collective wage agreement C.
For ﬁrm i, a unilateral deviation from point C in Figure 2 is only attractive
if the increased piece rate is compensated by a lower ﬁxed wage, resulting in a
move towards the south–east. However, the collective minimum wage agreement
only allows the principals to move north–east. The only intersection between
the lens and the permitted deviations is point C itself. The collective wage
agreement, therefore, stabilizes the cartel by eﬀectively implementing a “ﬁxed
wage brake” against the temptation to deviate.
113.4.3 Bargaining power on the part of the union
We have demonstrated that the cartel agreement (FC
i , wC
i ) attains a monopoly
solution which maximizes the cartel’s proﬁt. It is stable if downwards deviations
are legally prohibited by a collective wage agreement. If the agreement (FC
i ,
wC
i ) is a take–it–or–leave–it oﬀer to the labor union, its members obtain no
more than their outside option utility level of u. In this section, we introduce
bargaining power on the part of the union and derive the symmetric Nash–
bargaining solution.7 Let the index B indicate the Nash–bargaining results.
The symmetric Nash–bargaining solution rests on four axioms, among them
Pareto–optimality and individual rationality. Pareto–optimality demands that
the parties agree upon the cartel piece rate, hence wB = wC
i .8 If a collective
wage agreement allows for a stable product market cartel, then it generates
a bargaining rent for the parties, which equals the cartel proﬁts net of the
duopoly proﬁts. This rent is distributed among the parties via the ﬁxed wage.
The union receives a share of this rent if the agreed upon ﬁxed wage FB exceeds
the minimum ﬁxed wage, i.e., if FB > FC
i . In other words, each principal pays
an “entrance fee” into the cartel which amounts to FB − FC
i .
The employers’ association receives each ﬁrm’s cartel proﬁt and gives up the
disagreement payoﬀ, namely each ﬁrm’s duopoly proﬁt. Hence, the employers’
association’s share of the bargaining rent amounts to 2[Πi(FB,wC
i )−ΠD
i ]. The
union’s threat point is given by twice the duopoly utility level, u. Its members
each receive FB plus the cartel piece rate on the eﬃcient output, and have to
bear the corresponding eﬀort costs. The union’s share of the bargaining rent
thus is 2[FB + wC
i eC
i − c(eC
i ) − u]. This allows us to state the Nash product as
4[Πi(FB,wC
i ) − ΠD
i ][FB + wC
i eC
i − c(eC
i ) − u].
Recall that wC
i = a/3, ei(wi) = wi/2 and ΠD
i = 2a2/25−u. Substituting these














7For the main results of our paper, the solution concept applied to the bargaining stage is
immaterial, as long as it satisﬁes the axioms of Pareto–eﬃciency and individual rationality.
8This simpliﬁcation is due to the assumptions of linear demand and quadratic eﬀort costs.
In other models, the eﬃcient variable wage is not necessarily constant, as has been pointed
out in the literature on monopoly unions and eﬃcient bargaining, see, e.g., McDonald/Solow
(1981) or Espinosa/Rhee (1989).
12The symmetric Nash bargaining solution ˆ FB maximizes this Nash product. The
explicit solution then is ˆ FB = u − 47a2/1800, which splits the total bargaining
rent equally. The union obtains the payoﬀ UB with
UB( ˆ FB,wC
i ) = 2u +
ΠC − ΠD
2
= 2u + ΠC
i − ΠD
i .
Each ﬁrm pays a part of the additional proﬁt to its employee, in excess of
the minimum ﬁxed wage in the optimal cartel solution. Thus, the individual
proﬁt of each ﬁrm is smaller than in a cartel with collective wage agreement
but full bargaining power; the axiom of individual rationality ensures, however,



























Figure 3 visualizes the incentive situation within one ﬁrm if a collective
wage agreement (FB,wB) exists, which is represented by point B. This agree-
ment could be the outcome of Nash bargaining if the union has positive bar-
gaining power. Compared to the situation in which the bargaining power of the
union is zero (point C), the area of allowed deviations from this agreement is
shifted upwards. The agent’s participation constraint is unmodiﬁed if we as-
sume that he is left with his outside option u in case he rejects to work for his
employer. This increases the size of the exchange lens that consists of mutually
beneﬁcial wage combinations. The only intersection between the lens and the
permitted deviations area is the point B itself. Thus, even if the union captures
13a part of the bargaining rent, the collective wage agreement prohibits any devi-
ation from it that is bilaterally beneﬁcial. Therefore, the cartel is stabilized by
the collective wage agreement.
4 Conclusion
We set up a model that combines a Cournot duopoly with intra–ﬁrm conﬂicts in
the context of a simple moral hazard model. We have derived both the Cournot
equilibrium in wages, and the wages a cartel would choose when planning with
two production sites and convex marginal costs. In comparison to the Cournot
duopoly situation, the optimal wage structure for a cartel consists of a lower
variable wages, in order to reduce output, and a higher ﬁxed wage (to satisfy
the agents’ participation constraints).
This result has been derived under the assumption that both cartel mem-
bers stick to the contract. However, the optimal cartel wage structure does not
constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium. Insofar, the wage cartel is as instable
as an output quota cartel. Yet, there is one important diﬀerence between these
two settings: While the quota cartel is illegal, a collective wage agreement can
be legally enforced. This stabilizing eﬀect endows the labor union with a posi-
tion which is remarkably similar to the economic function of the Sicilian Maﬁa.
According to Bandiera (2003), the Maﬁa provided enforcement for cartels in
exchange for a share of the increased proﬁts.
An enforceable collective wage agreement can also be seen as a tool that
solves the commitment problem of an upstream monopolist facing several ﬁrms
in the downstream market.9 Without such a commitment device, the monopolist
cannot extract more than the oligopoly rent from the downstream market. With
the commitment device at hand, the cartel rent is within reach.
Applying the Nash–bargaining solution to the collective bargaining stage
allows us to derive a distribution scheme for the cartel rent between the two
downstream ﬁrms and the upstream labor union. The side payment from the
ﬁrms to the union has to take the form of a higher ﬁxed wage. Thus, our results
are in contrast to those of Chemla (2003), who ﬁnds that upstream monopolists
may capture a higher share of the decreasing rents of the downstream market
as competition becomes more intensive. In our model, the upstream union may
9See Rey/Tirole (2006, 12-14).
14bargain for a larger share when the collective wage agreement helps to stabilize
a cartel on the downstream market.
The principal–agent model we have employed here is rather simple, yet
suﬃcient to derive the basic insights. The limitation of our focus to linear con-
tracts is a prerequisite for the stabilizing eﬀect of enforceable collective wage
agreements. However, there are many options to enrich the model. For instance,
we could introduce risk–aversion on the side of the agent, but this would only re-
inforce the derived results. Hence, even under more sophisticated assumptions
regarding the intra–ﬁrm conﬂict the strategic eﬀect of collective wage agree-
ments can be maintained.
The insights of this paper are relevant for strategic management consid-
erations. They may also contribute to the solution of the “ﬁxed wage puzzle”.
Moreover, our results are relevant for economic policy, and in particular for
cartel authorities: They should not only look for direct cartel agreements when
trying to identify illegal collusive behavior. Collective wage agreements should
also raise suspicion, in particular if they prescribe intra–ﬁrm incentives which ap-
pear ineﬃcient at ﬁrst glance. Such agreements may exert an anti–competitive
behavior not only on the upstream labor market, but also on the downstream
product market.
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